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Abstract  
This study examines the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on small and 
medium-sized (SME) firm performance. Rather than relying on country-specific proxies 
for EPL, as is common in the literature, we compute firm-specific measures of a firm’s 
exposure to EPL by using a panel dataset of 13,112 Belgian SMEs for the period between 
2000 and 2009. The empirical results show that firms perform better when faced with 
lower hiring and firing costs through the use of more blue-collar labour contracts. The 
evidence showing improved performance by firms that attempt to achieve greater 
flexibility by hiring more temporary workers is limited. 
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Introduction 
It has been noted that non-financial stakeholders are considered to have a greater 
influence on firms, which themselves function as sets of interrelated contracts between 
many different stakeholders (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Harrison and Wicks, 2013; 
Jensen, 2001). This theory suggests that firm performance varies with the rights and 
relative bargaining power of multiple stakeholders; this implies that all stakeholder rights 
and incentives should be considered in an analysis of firm functioning (Russo and Perrini, 
2010). Business and corporate finance research, however, predominantly focuses on three 
stakeholder types, i.e., shareholders, creditors and management. The focus on financial 
stakeholders has also been largely adopted by researchers in law and economics 
(commencing with La Porta et al., 1998). This article explicitly contributes to the 
literature on firm performance by examining the role of a non-financial stakeholder who 
engages in contracts with firms: employees. More specifically, we examine the impact of 
employment protection legislation (EPL) on small and medium sized (SME) firm 
profitability. 
Traditionally, the literature has focused on the effects of EPL on employment (Addison 
and Teixeira, 2003; Autor et al., 2006; Bentolila and Bertola, 1990) and on labour 
productivity (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Nickell and Layard, 1999). These studies usually 
commence from a labour market stance, studying the trade-off between protecting the 
rights of individual employees and the costs EPL imposes. For instance, Hopenhayn and 
Rogerson (1993) and Kambourov (2009) argue that high employment adjustment costs 
hamper the reallocation of labour from declining industries into new ones, which would 
negatively affect economic growth. Studies in the wake of Lazaer’s (1990) seminal paper 
have often made a connection between cross-country differences in EPL and higher 
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unemployment rates and longer average periods of unemployment. This has encouraged 
many governments and international organizations to make a case for labour market 
deregulation (Coudouel and Paci, 2006). Since the early 2000s, however, the focus of the 
EPL-literature has shifted towards the impact of regulatory hiring and firing costs on 
individual firms’ decision-making processes. Examples include research on the effect of 
EPL on firm investment (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Radulescu and Robson, 2013), 
multinationals’ location decisions (Dewit et al., 2009; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005), 
venture capital investments (Bonini and Alkan, 2012; Bozkaya and Kerr, 2014), debt 
policy (Simintzi et al., 2015) and employment relationships (Atkinson et al., 2016). 
The expected effect of employment regulation on firm profitability, however, remains 
unclear from the evidence within the previous literatures. On the one hand, firms subject 
to restrictive employment protection regulation incur large compliance costs, which may 
hamper their production processes (Autor et al., 2007). On the other hand, firms can make 
use of stricter EPL to motivate workers to invest in gaining the knowledge they need to 
improve efficiency and so to contribute to enhanced profitability (Bassanini et al., 2009). 
This article empirically examines the overall impact of EPL on firm performance. By 
using a sample of Belgian SMEs, we contribute to the literature on EPL as first, the 
existing literature mainly applies country-specific employment protection legislation 
indices (Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Radulescu and Robson, 2013). The use of country-
specific variables, however, implicitly assumes that the level of employment protection 
is the same for all employees in a given country and that a firm cannot differentiate in 
terms of employment protection. If firms’ owners/managers can choose between different 
types of labour contracts, this assumption is violated. We therefore, use firm-specific 
variables to measure the extent to which firms are subject to employment protection; this 
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is possible as all Belgian limited liability firms (including SMEs) not only are required to 
disclose financial data but also have a legal obligation to provide up to 174 items of 
workforce-related information. This is among the most stringent reporting requirements 
in Europe.  
Second, our Belgian setting allows us not only to compute firm-specific variables for 
a very large set of companies but also to define a unique firm-specific EPL variable. In 
the few studies where a firm-specific employment protection variable is used, the variable 
is based on the differences between temporary and permanent workers (Valverde et al., 
2000). The reasoning is that temporary workers provide labour flexibility as dismissal 
costs are limited in comparison with dismissal costs for permanent employees. This study 
not only makes use of the difference between temporary and permanent workers but also 
accounts for the difference between Belgium’s distinct white-collar and blue-collar 
employment contracts. Employees bound by a white-collar contract are granted 
substantially more employment protection by law. Therefore, it is less expensive for firms 
to hire and fire blue-collar employees than their white-collar counterparts. Differences in 
blue and white-collar contract types may thus be more important than differences between 
temporary and permanent contracts, as the average percentage of blue-collar workers in 
a firm is 66% while temporary workers represent only 4% of the workforce in our sample.  
Third, our sample comprises SMEs, while the majority of the existing literature limits 
the analysis to large quoted companies, partly owing to data availability issues. Studying 
the effects of EPL for large firms is more likely to introduce noise since quoted companies 
often have employees in many different countries, which all impose diverse employment 
protection rules. In addition, the issue of addressing EPL with regard to flexibility in 
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decision making and the potential of layoffs may also be relatively more important for 
SMEs given the entrepreneurial environment, small size and lower diversification.  
The results indicate that firms that are less hampered by hiring and firing costs and that 
are consequently more flexible in adjusting their workforce perform better. Firms that 
hire more blue-collar workers, who are less expensive to fire than white-collar workers, 
have higher levels of return on assets and of value added. Furthermore, firms perform 
better if they hire relatively more workers under a blue-collar contract than firms 
commonly hire in the industry. The employment of temporary workers does not have a 
consistently significant effect on performance in our multivariate analyses; however, the 
lack of significance may arise because firms in our sample make relatively little use of 
this form of employment. The findings are also robust for various changes in the 
estimation approach and model specifications. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section describes the 
preceding literature on the topic. Then, hypotheses are formulated, the empirical model 
is developed, and variables are defined. A description is then provided of the sample and 
univariate statistics, followed by a discussion of the results of the empirical analyses and 
robustness checks. The final section concludes the study, gives an overview of the study’s 
limitations and provides avenues for further research.  
 
Employment protection and performance: The literature 
EPL is defined as any set of rules that limits an employer’s ability to dismiss an 
employee without delay or costs. For example, these rules include administrative 
procedures, trial periods, notices of termination, severance payments, measures that 
increase the difficulty of dismissal and additional measures for collective dismissals 
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(Addison and Teixeira, 2003; Pissarides, 2001). A firm that is subject to less restrictive 
employment protection rules by definition has fewer hiring and firing costs (Bertola, 
1994; Bird and Knopf, 2009; Lazear, 1990). From here onwards, we will refer to a firm 
that is subject to less restrictive EPL rules as a flexible firm. 
Theory predicts that stricter employment protection rules can have a negative effect 
on firm performance or, equivalently, that less strict EPL can have a positive effect on 
performance. Several justifications underlie such theory. First, by definition, it is less 
expensive to lay off non-productive workers if firms are less hampered by legal hiring 
and firing costs. Consequently, less restrictive EPL allows firms to allocate human capital 
more efficiently and at a lower cost, which is expected to have a positive effect on firm 
performance (Autor et al., 2007; Bauernschuster, 2013; Bertola, 1994).  
Second, as firms can adjust their workforce and curtail wage expenditures more 
quickly, fluctuations in customer demand and volatility of returns may be mitigated more 
easily in less restrictive EPL systems (Lane et al., 1998; Michie and Sheehan-Quinn, 
2001; Valverde et al., 2000). Indeed, some evidence suggests that firms in volatile sectors 
are more sensitive to EPL. For instance, Cuñat and Melitz (2012) argue that firms in 
volatile sectors that operate in a weak employment protection regime have a comparative 
advantage in international trade, and they find that volatile sectors are larger in countries 
with more labour flexibility. 
The third argument is based on the effect of EPL on productivity. Indeed, more labour 
protection may have a negative effect on productivity for the following reasons. From the 
employers’ viewpoint, hiring and firing costs increase the productivity threshold at which 
firms are willing to dismiss workers. Consequently, firms employ unproductive workers 
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longer when EPL is strict (Autor et al., 2007; Bassanini et al., 2009; Bird and Knopf, 
2009). Several empirical studies confirm the negative effect of strict labour regulation on 
productivity (Autor et al., 2007; Bassanini et al., 2009; Besley and Burgess, 2004; 
Cingano et al., 2010; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Kleinknecht et al., 2006). If firms are 
less productive under a strict employment protection regime, they are expected to be less 
profitable than a comparable flexible firm.  
In contrast, several counter-arguments suggest that stricter employment protection has 
a positive effect on firm performance. First, it is less costly to dismiss workers in an 
environment in which employees are weakly protected by EPL. As employees in such 
firms face the possibility of being discharged unexpectedly, they are not motivated to 
invest in specialized skills. Further, if a firm is faced with workers who are not sufficiently 
skilled or who are not willing to improve their skills, the firm may experience lower 
profitability. Providing evidence of disturbed adoption of skills in high EPL countries, 
Gust and Marquez (2004) demonstrate that such circumstances impede the 
implementation of information technologies and slow down productivity growth. 
Furthermore, a firm in a low employment protection setting will have to offer higher 
wages as a hedge against the increased risk of being dismissed in order to attract 
specialized and skilled employees who are willing to invest in firm-specific human 
capital. These extra labour costs increase firms’ production costs and may thus reduce 
firm profitability (Bassanini et al., 2009; Belot et al., 2007; Lane et al., 1998; Michie and 
Sheehan-Quinn, 2001; Pissarides, 2001).  
A strand in the EPL literature related to this last argument examines whether 
innovation, which is an activity that thrives on knowledge, is affected by EPL. As greater 
hiring and firing costs increase the willingness of workers to invest in skills, firms are 
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expected to be more innovative in rigid labour markets. Acharya et al. (2014) indeed find 
that dismissal laws appear to have an ex-ante positive incentive effect by encouraging 
firms and their employees to engage in more successful innovative pursuits. Since 
innovation is stimulated in rigid labour markets while also having a positive impact on 
performance (Blundell et al., 1999; Roberts, 1999), firm profitability is expected to be 
lower in firms that are subject to low EPL standards. 
Next, since flexibility may have a detrimental impact on social cohesion and trust 
between employees and employers and potentially facilitates the leaking of trade secrets 
and knowledge, firms in a flexible employment environment will have to monitor 
employees to a greater extent (Kleinknecht et al., 2006). These monitoring costs may also 
hinder performance in a flexible regime. 
The empirical literature mostly provides evidence of a negative impact of EPL on 
financial performance, which is measured by using different proxies of EPL and various 
methods. For instance, Abraham (2004) uses an event study to demonstrate that 
shareholder returns fall in response to decisions that impose firing costs on American 
firms. Bird and Knopf (2009) confirm that the adoption of wrongful discharge protection 
by U.S. state courts increases labour expenses while also negatively affecting 
profitability. In a study on Chinese firms, Lane et al. (1998) show that less labour 
flexibility, measured as the speed of adjustment to demand shocks, negatively affects 
profitability. Valverde et al. (2000) and Lepak et al. (2003) also find that firms perform 
better if they are less subject to EPL. Based on survey data originating from twelve 
European countries, Valverde et al. (2000) report a positive relationship between levels 
of temporary workers and firm performance. The results of Lepak et al. (2003) for US 
firms indicate that hiring more flexible workers to perform contract work is positively 
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associated with profitability and stock market performance. Furthermore, Almeida and 
Carneiro (2009) show that in areas in Brazil in which the enforcement of employment 
laws is strict – i.e., areas with de facto high employment protection – firms are smaller 
and have lower turnover and output. Martins (2009) finds that Portuguese firms with 
greater employment flexibility exhibit increases in total sales and surplus per worker. 
Using survey data from the UK, Michie and Sheehan-Quinn (2001) are the only 
researchers to have found that short-term contracts, a lack of employer commitment to 
job security, low levels of training and low levels of human resource sophistication – and 
thus greater flexibility – negatively affect corporate financial performance. 
Based on theoretical concepts from the literature, the effect of employment flexibility 
on firm performance is unclear. Most of the existing evidence leads us to expect that firms 
will perform better when they are subject to less employment protection. However, 
whether this is also the case in our SME setting remains an empirical question. 
 
Flexibility and hypotheses 
In Belgium, two legal distinctions in types of employee contracts allow firms to influence 
employment flexibility. The first type of flexibility is provided by the distinction between 
blue-collar worker (arbeider/ouvrier) and white-collar worker (bediende/employé) 
contracts1. With this distinction, employee contracts are classified according to the nature 
of the job. According to the Law on Employment Contracts, a blue-collar worker is an 
employee who primarily performs manual work, while a white-collar worker’s job mainly 
consists of intellectual work. In recent decades, however, the link between the type of 
labour and the contract type has become blurred as the distinction between manual and 
intellectual labour has become unclear, which provides flexibility for employers and 
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employees in reaching an agreement. If an employee feels that his or her rights are being 
violated by having been given an inappropriate contract type, he/she can go to labour 
court where judges have wide discretionary powers in deciding case by case whether an 
employee is a ‘true’ white- or blue-collar worker. Consequently, in practice, it is not 
feasible to offer employees with pure white-collar job content a blue-collar contract 
(although some anecdotal evidence suggests that firms in distress have sometimes offered 
skilled workers the choice between dismissal and a contract change), as doing so is highly 
unlikely to be upheld in labour court. However, it is possible to give a white-collar 
contract to employees who do work that would typically be considered blue collar in job 
negotiations or as a reward (instead of a promotion and/or wage increase), as doing so is 
to the advantage of the employee (Engels, 2002).  
During our sample period, white-collar workers are substantially more protected by 
law than blue-collar workers: their trial period and terms of notice are longer; their 
contracts cannot be interrupted because of economic reasons, technical disturbance or 
weather conditions; and the rules concerning the inability to work in the case of illness 
for white-collar workers are more favourable than those for blue-collar workers 
(Blanpain, 2010). To give a specific example, the legal period for required notice of a 
blue-collar worker with five years of seniority is 28 days if he or she is fired by the 
employer. In contrast, the period of notice for a white-collar worker with the same level 
of seniority is at least six months, but it may be even longer depending on the employee’s 
wage. Consequently, employers can dismiss blue-collar workers more easily and at a 
lower cost, and they are therefore more flexible when they hire more blue-collar workers. 
This leads us to the first testable hypothesis: 
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H1a. Firms that use more flexible (blue-collar) labour contracts have higher 
performance. 
It goes without saying that the number of blue-collar employees is highly dependent on 
the industry in which the firm is active. We will therefore also explore an industry-
adjusted version of Hypothesis 1: 
H1b. Firms that use relatively more flexible (blue-collar) labour contracts than their 
industry peers have higher performance. 
The second type of employment flexibility is based on the difference between 
permanent and temporary employment agreements. In Belgium, as in most other 
European countries, employment contracts can be categorized according to the duration 
of the contract. There are three relevant categories of contracts: permanent contracts, 
fixed-term contracts and fixed-job contracts. If an employer hires an employee for a fixed 
period or a fixed job, the employer has the choice of renewing the contract or ceasing 
collaboration at the end of the period or when the job is completed. Firms do not have to 
pay any firing costs at the end of the contract. Goux et al. (2001) indeed find that it is less 
costly to adjust the number of fixed-term workers than the number of permanent workers 
in a firm. Therefore, firms are more flexible in terms of EPL if they hire more temporary 
workers and fixed-job workers than permanent workers. In line with Hypotheses 1a and 
1b, this leads to the following testable hypotheses: 
H2a. Firms that use more temporary labour contracts have higher performance. 
H2b. Firms that use relatively more temporary labour contracts than their industry 
peers have higher performance. 
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Model and variables 
To examine the effect of employment flexibility on performance, we use a least 
squares regression model in which we include both industry and year effects. In equation 
(1), φi are the industry dummies, τt are the time dummies and εi,t is the error term, which 
is clustered at firm level (Petersen, 2009).2 
Performancei,t = α + β0  Flexibilityi,t-1 + βi Control Variablesi,t-1 + φi + τt + εi,t     (1) 
The independent variable Flexibilityit, which captures the labour flexibility of firm i 
in year t, is the variable of interest in our setting. The flexibility variables BCit and 
FLEXbcit are based on the legal difference between blue-collar and white-collar workers. 
BCit is the percentage of blue-collar workers in the total workforce a firm i employed in 
year t expressed in full-time equivalents. FLEXbcit stands for the percentage of blue-collar 
workers in full-time equivalents that firm i employs relative to its industry peers in year 
t. This variable is computed by subtracting the median percentage of blue-collar workers 
in the industry of firm i in year t from the percentage of blue-collar workers in that firm.3 
Industries that contain less than twenty firms per year are excluded for the composition 
of FLEXbcit to ensure that the empirical industry-year median represents a reliable 
measure of centrality.4 The advantage of using FLEXbcit is that the value of this variable 
immediately shows the extent to which a firm is flexible: if it is positive, the firm has to 
pay fewer hiring and firing costs and is consequently more flexible than the industry 
median, and if it is negative, it has to pay more costs.  
As in Lepak et al. (2003) and Valverde et al. (2000), the number of temporary workers 
is used to create a second type of variable for employment flexibility. The variable FTit 
stands for the percentage of fixed-term and fixed-job workers in firm i at time t expressed 
in full-time equivalents.5 FLEXftit is an industry-corrected flexibility measure and is 
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constructed by subtracting the median percentage of fixed-term employees in the industry 
of firm i in year t from the percentage of fixed-term workers in firm i. As with FLEXbcit, 
industries containing fewer than twenty firms are not taken into account. Further, if 
FLEXftit is positive, the firm is less hindered by firing costs and consequently more 
flexible in comparison with the median firm of its industry, and if the variable is negative, 
it is more hindered by hiring costs and less flexible. An overview of the definitions of 
these variables and of the variables discussed below is given in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
The dependent variable is firm performance. The dataset contains SMEs, and for that 
reason, our sample contains firms that are not listed on the stock exchange. Consequently, 
market-based profitability measures, such as Tobin’s Q, cannot be applied. Therefore, we 
use return on assets (ROAi,t,) – calculated as the ratio of EBITDA6 of the current firm year 
to total assets of the previous year (Core et al., 1999). Relative to return on equity, a return 
on assets ratio has the advantage of not being influenced by a firm’s financing policy.7 
We employ a broad performance indicator (EBITDA) in the numerator of the ratio so that 
we can examine the base profitability of an SME’s activities without including the 
confounding effects of its capital structure, tax policies or depreciation policies. However, 
as labour costs have been subtracted from the numerator, ROA can be directly affected 
by possible differences in costs per worker across contract types. We therefore also use a 
value added ratio (VAi,t), which is not sensitive to this problem, as a measure of 
performance. This variable is calculated by subtracting the costs of materials and outside 
services from revenue to obtain the so-called value added of the firm; next value added is 
divided by total assets of the previous year (Arcelus et al., 2014).  
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Age, size, leverage and risk are used as control variables to control for other firm 
characteristics that may influence firm performance. Agei,t is calculated by taking the log 
of the number of years that firm i has been in operation as of year t. This variable is 
included as firm performance and is likely to vary by the age of the firm: indeed, older 
firms may have fewer investment opportunities, which may lead to lower profitability 
(Buysschaert et al., 2008). Sizei,t is computed as the log of total assets of firm i in year t. 
As larger firms may gain advantages of scale and scope, size can be expected to have a 
positive effect on performance. However, the performance-size relationship could also be 
negative because of diseconomies of scale (Goddard et al., 2005). Leveragei,t is 
constructed as the ratio of long-term and short-term liabilities over total assets and 
accounts for the financing policy of firm i in year t. The ex-ante expected effect of debt 
on profitability is not straightforward. For instance, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that 
firms with favourable growth prospects will exhaust their internal funds before soliciting 
outside funding; therefore, leverage is expected to be negatively related to firm 
performance. However, Jensen (1986) states that debt may discipline managerial 
behaviour and suggests that the correlation between profits and leverage is positive. Riski,t 
measures the volatility of the returns and is computed as the standard deviation of return 
on assets over the previous three firm years (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Core et al., 1999). 
The correlation matrix of all main variables can be found in Appendix 1. To avoid 
simultaneity problems, the explanatory variables all are lagged by one firm year. 
Sample and descriptive statistics 
Sample selection 
 The sample contains Belgian SMEs, for which information for the period between 
2000 and 2009 was collected from unconsolidated financial statements obtained from the 
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BelFirst database (Bureau Van Dijk EP).8 An important consideration from this article’s 
viewpoint is that all Belgian firms are obliged not only to report standard financial 
information but also to disclose detailed information on the composition of their 
workforce in the so-called social balance sheet, including employee characteristics (e.g., 
gender and level of education) and the type of labour contract. Data from this social 
balance sheet allow us to construct the firm-specific EPL measures that are defined in the 
previous section. 
We first exclude micro-enterprises, i.e., firms employing fewer than 10 persons, from 
the sample.9 Second, financial, insurance and real-estate companies as well as public 
services companies are excluded. Third, firms with fewer than four consecutive years of 
data are eliminated since at least three consecutive years are needed to construct some of 
the variables. Including only firms that report four consecutive years of data has the 
additional advantage that the influence of unsuccessful start-ups is minimized. Fourth, 
only stand-alone firms that are not controlled by another firm are considered to avoid 
potential noise due to group-wide policies and to ensure that the sample comprises 
entrepreneurial firms.  
Following common practice, we omit firms with a leverage level higher than 100%, as 
such firms do not report the number of employees in full-time equivalents. Firm-years for 
which the absolute value of asset growth exceeds 100% are eliminated to reduce the effect 
of mergers, reorganizations and other major corporate events (Almeida and Campello, 
2007). The remaining control variables are winsorized at the 1% level. The resulting 
sample comprises 13,112 Belgian small and medium-sized firms with 69,653 firm-year 
observations.10 
16 
 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables. The firms employ 
65.96% blue-collar workers (BC) on average. The standard deviation of 32.66% for BC 
indicates that the dispersion amongst firms is large. FT, on the other hand, shows that 
temporary workers on average represent only 4.07% of the total workforce. The median 
FT-value indicates that at least half of the firms in the dataset do not employ any 
temporary workers. Nevertheless, the standard deviation of 9.93% for FT shows that this 
variable too has a certain degree of variability. The range and standard deviation of 
FLEXbc shows that firms in the same industry may indeed vary considerably in their 
relative use of blue- and white-collar contracts. In terms of profitability, our sample firms 
are doing well: the mean value of ROA is 17.45%, while the value added ratio (VA) 
amounts to 76.61% on average. Further, the median firm in our sample has EUR 1.70 
million in total assets, employs 19 full-time equivalent workers and is mature with an age 
of 19 years.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Results 
Univariate tests 
The univariate tests of Table 3 give a first indication of the relationship between 
employment flexibility and performance. These tests compare the performance of firms 
that are located in the upper and lower quartile in terms of labour flexibility. The left-
hand side concerns the medians. Consistent with the hypotheses, the Mann-Whitney 
equality test statistics show that more flexible firms have a higher performance, and the 
difference in performance is highly significant in all cases but is much larger for the 
flexibility measures based on blue- versus white-collar contracts than for the measures 
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based on temporary versus permanent contracts. For instance, the difference in the median 
ROA between the quartile of firms that uses the most blue-collar contracts relative to their 
industry peers (as measured by FLEXbc) and the quartile that uses the lowest number of 
blue-collar contracts relative to their industry peers is 2.51%, while the difference 
between the top and bottom quartiles based on the median industry-relative use of 
temporary contracts (as measured by FLEXft) is only 0.53%. The right-hand side of Table 
3 contains the analyses for the means, for which the results are highly similar to those 
found for the medians.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Regressions 
Panel A of Table 4 contains the least squares regressions for the flexibility measures BC 
and FLEXbc on ROA and VA.11 In line with Hypothesis 1a, the results in models (1) and 
(2) indicate that the percentage of blue-collar workers (BC) has a highly significant 
positive impact on performance. Firms that employ a higher percentage of employees 
with blue-collar contracts perform better in terms of not only ROA but also VA. The results 
of the effect of the industry-corrected flexibility measure FLEXbc on performance in 
models (3) and (4) confirm these findings and support Hypothesis 1b.12  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Panel B of Table 4 contains the results for the flexibility measures FT and FLEXft 
concerning temporary workers. The findings show that FT and FLEXft positively affect 
performance, albeit nonsignificantly. Hiring more temporary workers or more temporary 
workers than industry peers does not have a significant effect on ROA or VA. Hence, 
contrary to the univariate results in Table 3, the findings in Table 4 do not support 
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Hypotheses 2a and 2b. In other words, once other factors that may affect performance are 
controlled for, the effect of temporary workers is too small to be significant, which may 
be due to the relatively limited use of temporary workers by our sample firms. Throughout 
Table 4, Size, Age and Leverage are negatively related to performance. Thus, larger and 
older firms have lower performance. Taking on more debt also leads to lower 
performance. Furthermore, firms that are riskier have higher performance, in terms of 
both ROA and VA. 
Robustness checks 
The estimation method used for the results in Table 4 circumvents simultaneity issues 
by lagging the flexibility variables as well as the control variables by one period. To 
alleviate further concerns of endogeneity, a 2SLS instrumental variable approach is 
applied as a robustness check. Two variables are used as instrumental variables for the 
flexibility variables. The first variable contains the percentage of female employees per 
firm, and the second variable is the percentage of workers who work on a part-time basis 
in a firm. Table 5 presents the results for the instrumental variable approach. To limit 
table sizes in the robustness section, we report only the results for the BC and FLEXbc 
measures.13 The main results confirm our findings and show that firms that hire more 
blue-collar workers perform significantly better in terms of ROA (model 1), although the 
effect is not significant for the specification with FLEXbc (model 3). As before, hiring 
more fixed-term employees has a positive but nonsignificant effect on ROA (not 
reported). As the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests do not reveal the presence of an endogeneity 
problem in the ROA models14, the OLS estimates in Table 4 should be consistent and 
more efficient than the IV-estimates. The impact of BC and FLEXbc on VA remains 
positive and significant in models 2 and 4 of Table 5, and even the effect of FLEXft on 
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VA is significantly positive when we use the instrumental variable approach (consistent 
with Hypothesis 2b; results for FT and FLEXft not reported). However, the results for the 
VA IV regressions should be interpreted with caution, as the null hypothesis of the tests 
for over-identifying restrictions is rejected.15 Ideally, we would refer to the literature for 
other examples of suitable instruments, but unfortunately, there is very little available 
evidence. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
To obtain yet another view on the problem, we also run a different type of robustness 
check to specifically focus on cross-sectional variation, as in Faulkender and Smith 
(2014): we estimate in-between regressions (using the average of all the variables in the 
model over time). The results in Table 6 confirm the previous findings: firms that employ 
more blue-collar workers perform better, ceteris paribus. In most models, firms do not 
have measurably higher performance when they employ more temporary workers, 
although 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹���������� has a borderline significant positive effect on 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉���� (not reported). It 
should also be noted that from an economic viewpoint, the positive relationship between 
performance and both BC and FLEXbc that we find in the fixed-effect models, the IV 
regressions and the between regressions is unlikely to result from reverse causality. 
Indeed, there does not seem to be a reason for firms to give their employees contracts 
with poor protection owing to their high performance. If reverse causality were very 
important, one would expect to find the opposite relationship: firms that are doing well 
may be more likely to reward their employees with better protected contracts. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
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In addition to the instrumental variable and in-between approaches in Tables 5 and 6, 
a number of other robustness checks were performed. First, to account for a specific 
element of Belgian labour legislation, a split sample analysis based on the number of 
employees has been performed. As soon as the number of employees exceeds 50, Belgian 
firms are legally obliged to install a Committee for Prevention and Protection at Work 
(CPPW).16 The CPPW comprises the employer and at least two employee representatives, 
and blue-collar and white-collar workers are proportionally represented. The committee’s 
main task is to improve the well-being of the employees in their work situation by 
advising the firm on issues such as employee complaints and safety problems. In addition, 
an employer cannot make adjustments to the firm's employment policy without consulting 
his or her employees and without justifying the decisions. Accordingly, the presence of a 
CPPW may reduce flexibility, as it offers employees a platform to collect firm 
information, to bargain with the employer and to put pressure on the firm. For the 
subsample of firms without a CPPW, the findings are the same as before. The coefficients 
of BC and FLEXbc in Table 7 are significantly positive, while FT and FLEXft (not 
reported) do not affect performance. Nevertheless, for the CPPW subsample, the results 
are less convincing, as only VA is borderline significantly positively affected by FLEXbc. 
These findings suggest that our earlier results are mainly driven by the group of firms 
with fewer than 50 employees, which are not obliged to have a CPPW in the firm. The 
decrease in flexibility due to the presence of a CPPW in larger firms may contribute to 
this lesser effect. However, as argued before, the flexibility offered by blue-collar worker 
contracts may be more important for smaller firms because they are less diversified and 
hence have less opportunity to shift labour to other uses within the firm.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
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Second, the choice between blue-collar and white-collar workers might also depend 
on the role of technology and innovation within the firm. Unfortunately, we cannot obtain 
data on fixed-asset investments linked to technology or innovation for the SMEs in our 
sample or detailed information on R&D spending. To get a clearer idea of whether the 
technological environment in which a firm is active plays a role, we define a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to an industry in a knowledge-intensive 
activity (kia) according to Eurostat’s classification and use interaction terms with this 
dummy variable to split the effect of our flexibility variables between knowledge-
intensive and non-knowledge intensive industries. The results for ROA in Table 8 are 
extremely close for both groups and are significantly positive, as before. Interestingly, 
there are some differences for the value added ratio VA: the BC-based variables are 
significantly positively related to performance in both activity types, but the effect is 
substantially larger in knowledge-intensive industries. With respect to the temporary 
contract variables (not reported), it turns out that having more temporary workers is 
significantly positively related to performance measured as VA, but only in knowledge-
intensive activities.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Third, as in Campello (2006), we recompute the flexibility measures FLEXbc and FLEXft 
by using industry means instead of industry medians and obtain very similar results. 
Furthermore, the results are also robust to the exclusion of the years 2008 and 2009, which 
could be affected by the recession following the subprime mortgage crisis, from the 
sample period. Next, the inclusion of a wage variable (defined as the ratio between total 
wages and the number of employees in FTE) to ensure that the results are not driven by 
wage costs along with an asset growth variable does not alter the findings. The findings 
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also do not substantially change when performance is regressed on both types of 
flexibility variables simultaneously, i.e., the measures based on the difference between 
blue- and white-collar workers and the measures based on the distinction between fixed-
term and permanent workers. Finally, we follow a matching strategy that starts by 
defining a group of observations in which firms use a relatively large amount of low-EPL 
contracts (top 25% in terms of BC or FT), and we then select a one-on-one matching 
sample from the remainder of the sample based on propensity score matching by using 
(a) industry and size and (b) size, age, leverage and risk. The positive and significant sign 
for BC confirms the results of the other analyses. Interestingly, after we implement the 
matching procedure, the effect of the temporary contract use (FT) becomes significant in 
all models, which is consistent with the second hypothesis.17  
 
Discussion, limitations and avenues for future research  
There is a lack of consensus regarding the effect of EPL on financial performance in 
the current literature. On the one hand, firms that are subject to higher EPL will have 
higher hiring and firing costs (Autor et al., 2007), which makes them less responsive to 
changing circumstances and shifts in demand (Cuñat and Melitz, 2012). Furthermore, 
more restrictive employment protection rules may give employees the incentive to shirk 
more (Cingano et al., 2010), while employers may be simultaneously less inclined to fire 
their employees to avoid EPL costs (Bird and Knopf, 2009). Accordingly, we would 
expect a positive effect of flexible employment protection rules on financial performance. 
On the other hand, a stringent EPL environment may encourage employees to invest in 
firm-specific and specialized skills (Gust and Marquez, 2004), leading to more innovation 
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(Acharya et al., 2014). Thus, more protective employment protection rules may also lead 
to better performing firms.  
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first article to investigate the impact of labour 
flexibility on the performance of SMEs on the basis of firm-specific measures of labour 
flexibility. Such a study is possible because of the unique data availability within our 
Belgian setting. Specifically, we are able to investigate two different types of flexibility, 
i.e., temporary versus permanent labour contracts and blue-collar versus white-collar 
labour contracts. Both temporary employees and blue-collar employees are subject to 
relatively less restrictive labour protection rules.  
Although our univariate results indicate that firms that employ more temporary 
workers perform better, our multivariate results are generally unable to confirm this 
effect, likely because only a small portion of employees are employed under this type of 
contract. Employing more employees with a blue-collar labour contract, however, does 
have a positive impact on profitability and value added in both the univariate and 
multivariate tests. Further, ceteris paribus, firms that hire relatively more blue-collar 
workers than their industry peers are more profitable.  
The results are robust to various changes in the estimation approach, model 
specification and variable definitions. In addition, the findings appear to be mainly driven 
by the smaller firms in the sample, as the positive effect on performance of hiring more 
blue-collar workers is nonsignificant for mid-sized firms that are subject to legislation 
requiring firms to install a committee in which employees are represented and that are 
therefore likely to lose some labour flexibility. However, it should be noted that the 
percentage of mid-sized firms in the sample is quite low (9.40%), implying that the results 
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of a split-sample analysis should be interpreted with caution. Another limitation of our 
study is that our results may not be generalizable to other types of firms because of our 
focus on independent SMEs. In larger firms, or in SMEs that are part of business groups, 
the link between EPL and performance may be more complex, as there may be group-
wide employment strategies or exposure to different EPL systems owing to activities in 
multiple countries. A final limitation is that we rely on archival data, which allows us to 
construct a very large testing sample; however, these data do not contain any explicit 
information about managerial strategy and decision making with regard to EPL.  
Overall, this article shows that EPL has a significant impact on SME performance, 
which has clear policy implications given that our results indicate that changes in the legal 
framework may have consequences for a large number of firms. Recently, a legal change 
eliminated some of the differences between contract types in response to a judgment of 
the Belgian Constitutional Court, which declared the difference in rules between white- 
and blue-collar workers with respect to the period of notice and to work disability to be 
unconstitutional and in violation of the principle of equality. In December 2013, the 
Belgian government adopted a more harmonizing regulation, for instance, by stipulating 
that a blue-collar worker’s period of notice equals a white-collar’s period of notice for 
contracts established after 1 January 2014. This reform had no impact during this article's 
sample period, and we expect that the main results will continue to hold for several years, 
as existing labour contracts remain largely unaffected and as there is an extensive 
transition period during which the old regulations will still have an effect. However, the 
reform does open up future research possibilities since it provides a natural experiment 
setting for the impact of EPL on firm behaviour. For instance, it could be hypothesized 
that firms may shift to hiring more temporary workers to safeguard their flexibility and 
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performance as the effects of the reform gradually become more important over time.
  
 
 
Notes 
1   Articles 2 and 3 of the Law on the Employment Contracts of July 3rd, 1987. 
 
2  The flexibility variables, which are the variables of interest, are very stable over time. 
Therefore, a fixed-firm effects approach cannot be used since such an approach would 
negate the effect of the flexibility variables.  
3  Industries are defined at the 2-digit level and based on NACE-BEL industry 
classification codes. In descending order of importance, our sample comprises firms 
from the following industries: retail & wholesale (32.6%), manufacturing (31.7%), 
services (13.9%), construction (10.1%), transportation (9.4%) and food production 
(2.3%). The industry medians used to compute the industry-adjusted variables are 
based on the population of all SMEs (excluding micro-enterprises) in the BelFirst 
database. As a robustness check, industries are also defined at a broader 1-digit level 
as well as on a 3-digit level. The results are available upon request and remain 
qualitatively the same. 
4  The findings do not qualitatively change when these firms are included in the analyses. 
5  Using only fixed-term workers to construct FTit or FLEXftit does not have a qualitative 
impact on the findings.  
6  Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization. 
7  Return on equity (ROE) may be less suitable as a measure for performance in an SME 
setting, since (a) profits can be strongly influenced by the financing policy of the firm 
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and (b) the book value of shareholder’s equity can be quite volatile in smaller firms, 
leading to extreme values for ROE.  
8  We follow the European Commission’s definition of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, which states that “[t]he category of micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons 
and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual 
balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million.” (Art 2.1 recommendation 
2003/361/EC) 
9  Micro-firms employing fewer than 10 employees are not included as their 
organizations tend to be less well structured (Molly et al., 2010) and as the labour-
related ratios for these firms may suffer from small denominator problems. 
10 As a result of all the steps reported on p.19, our sample covers approximately 58.9% of 
all Belgian SMEs in the size class we consider that report financial statements during 
our sample period. 
11  Note that the number of observations is lower in the regression tables than in the 
summary statistics table (Table 2) because (a) because the summary statistics include 
every available value of each variable while only those observations for which all 
variables are available are included in the regressions and (b) because the regressions 
use lagged variables.  
12  To give an idea of the economic significance of the results, if all variables in the model 
were at their mean value and if the value of FLEXbc were to increase from its mean 
to its mean plus one standard deviation, ROA would increase from 17.38% to 18.09% 
– an absolute increase of 0.51% or a relative increase of 2.94%. 
13 The results for FT and FLEXft are available upon request. 
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14 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test scores (χ²) for the ROA models in Table 5 are 0.195 (p 
= 0.659) for model 1 and 1.303 (p = 0.254) for model 3. For the VA models, the test 
scores are 27.503 (model 2; p = 0.000) and 24.613 (model 4; p = 0.000). 
15  For the ROA models in Table 5, the Hansen J statistics are 0.662 (model 1; p = 0.416) 
and 0.096 (model 3: p = 0.757), and the first-stage F-statistics are very high (979.7 for 
model 1 and 775.2 for model 3), indicating that the instruments are valid and strong. 
However, for the VA models, the over-identification tests are rejected (Hansen J of 
11.086 for model 2 and 15.668 for model 4), which means that the strength of the 
instruments cannot be assessed. 
 
16  Comité voor Preventie en Bescherming op het Werk/Comité pour la Prévention et la 
Protection au Travail.  
17  All results from the additional robustness checks are available upon request. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition  Proxy for  
BCit Percentage of blue-collar workers in firm i in full-time 
equivalents in year t Flexibility 
FTit Percentage of temporary workers in firm i in full-time 
equivalents in year t Flexibility 
FLEXbcit Percentage of blue-collar workers in firm i in full-time 
equivalents – the median percentage of blue-collar workers 
in the industry of firm i in full-time equivalents in year t 
Flexibility  
FLEXftit Percentage of temporary workers in firm i in full-time 
equivalents – the median percentage of temporary workers 
in the industry of firm i in full-time equivalents in year t 
Flexibility 
ROAit (EBITDAi,t)/(total assetsi, t-1) Performance 
VAit (Revenue – costs of goods sold and of servicesi,t)/(total assetsi, t-1) Performance 
Leverageit (ST debt i,t + LT debti,t)/total assetsi,t Leverage 
Riskit σ(ROAi,t-2, ROAi,t-1, ROAi,t) Risk 
Ageit Ln(year of incorporationi – financial year t) Age 
Sizeit Ln(total assetsi,t) Firm Size 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics     
Variable Firm-Year Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
BC 69550 0.6596 0.7857 0.3266 0.0000 1.0000 
FT 69515 0.0407 0.0000 0.0993 0.0000 1.0000 
FLEXbc 62697 -0.0030 0.0000 0.2555 -0.9451 0.9877 
FLEXft 62672 0.0399 0.0000 0.0980 -0.0317 1.0000 
ROA 69641 0.1745 0.1533 0.1252 -0.1092 0.6180 
VA 68082 0.7661 0.6499 0.4878 0.0068 2.8133 
Leverage 69653 0.6698 0.6998 0.1907 0.1463 0.9790 
Risk 43577 0.0454 0.0346 0.0385 0.0000 0.3428 
Age 69327 22 19 14 1 109 
Total Assets 69653 3537 1703 8130 210 133108 
Employees 69653 28 19 26 10 250 
Notes: Total assets in thousands of euros; employees in full-time equivalents; other variables as 
defined in Table 1. 
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Table 3. Univariate tests        
  Medians   |MWW-test statistic|   Means   |t-value| 
 
Lowest 
25% 
values 
of 
Highest 
25% 
values 
of  
   
 
Lowest 
25% 
values 
of 
Highest 
25% 
values 
of  
   
 BC    BC   
ROA 0.1335 0.1906  (43.063)***  0.1565 0.2097  (38.434)*** 
VA 0.5222 0.9000  (78.953)***  0.6247 1.0267  (73.744)*** 
 FT    FT   
ROA 0.1521 0.1586  (5.898)***  0.1737 0.1786  (4.413)*** 
VA 0.6385 0.6755  (11.559)***  0.7498 0.8045  (12.156)*** 
 FLEXbc    FLEXbc   
ROA 0.1343 0.1594  (20.325)***  0.1546 0.1786  (17.662)*** 
VA 0.5388 0.6383  (29.211)***  0.6189 0.7994  (33.834)*** 
 FLEXft    FLEXft   
ROA 0.1524 0.1577  (4.413)***  0.1739 0.1776  (3.227)*** 
VA 0.6395 0.6756   (10.985)***   0.7491 0.8023   (11.335)*** 
Notes: This table provides univariate tests. The table contains the medians, the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney 
tests for the equality of medians (Wilcoxon T-statistic in parentheses), and the means and t-test scores 
for the equality of means (t-statistic in parentheses) of ROA and VA for firms with the 25% lowest and 
25% highest values of BC, FT, FLEXbc and FLEXft. The variables are as defined in Table 1. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4. The impact of flexibility on performance 
Panel A: The impact of BC and FLEXbc on performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable ROA VA ROA VA 
     
BC 0.021*** 0.084*** – – 
 [0.005] [0.016]   
FLEXbc – – 0.020*** 0.077*** 
   [0.005] [0.017] 
Size –0.009*** –0.280*** –0.010*** –0.285*** 
 [0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] 
Age –0.030*** –0.023*** –0.031*** –0.025*** 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.002] [0.006] 
Leverage –0.086*** –0.040** –0.087*** –0.035* 
 [0.006] [0.018] [0.006] [0.019] 
Risk 0.540*** 1.339*** 0.545*** 1.337*** 
 [0.030] [0.085] [0.031] [0.090] 
Constant 0.339*** 2.841*** 0.369*** 3.075*** 
 [0.017] [0.053] [0.014] [0.053] 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year Obs.  31,622 30,889 28,504 27,837 
Adj. R² 0.146 0.513 0.150 0.514 
Notes: This table contains the results of the least squares regressions of the effect of employment 
flexibility, measured as BC and FLEXbc, on performance during the period 2000-2009. All variables 
are as defined in Table 1. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 
1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 4 continued. The impact of flexibility on performance 
Panel B: The impact of FT and FLEXft on performance   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable ROA VA ROA VA 
     
FT 0.009 0.020 – – 
 [0.0101 [0.043]   
FLEXft – – 0.006 0.035 
   [0.010] [0.047] 
Size –0.010*** –0.285*** –0.011*** –0.288*** 
 [0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] 
Age –0.030*** –0.024*** –0.031*** –0.025*** 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.002] [0.006] 
Leverage –0.087*** –0.045** –0.088*** –0.040** 
 [0.005] [0.018] [0.006] [0.019] 
Risk 0.538*** 1.333*** 0.543*** 1.332*** 
 [0.030] [0.085] [0.032] [0.090] 
Constant 0.366*** 2.950*** 0.377*** 3.101*** 
 [0.015] [0.052] [0.014] [0.054] 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year Obs.  31,594 30,863 28,481 27,816 
Adj. R² 0.144 0.511 0.149 0.513 
Note: This table contains the results of the least squares regressions of the effect of employment 
flexibility, measured as FT and FLEXft, on performance during the period 2000-2009. All variables are 
as defined in Table 1. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level, and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 5. The impact of flexibility on performance - Instrumental variables approach 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable ROA VA ROA VA 
     
BC 0.020** 0.236*** – – 
 [0.009] [0.028]   
FLEXbc – – 0.010 0.195*** 
   [0.009] [0.027] 
Size –0.009*** –0.271*** –0.010*** –0.277*** 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] 
Age –0.030*** –0.021*** –0.031*** –0.023*** 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004] 
Leverage –0.086*** –0.035*** –0.087*** –0.030*** 
 [0.004] [0.011] [0.004] [0.011] 
Risk 0.542*** 1.343*** 0.546*** 1.342*** 
 [0.024] [0.063] [0.025] [0.066] 
Constant 0.363*** 2.525*** 0.375*** 3.123*** 
 [0.015] [0.047] [0.011] [0.038] 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year Obs.  31,521 30,796 28,424 27,762 
Adj. R² 0.147 0.507 0.151 0.511 
Notes: This table contains the results of the instrumental variables regressions of the effect of 
employment flexibility, using the percentage of female workers and of part-time workers in the firm as 
instruments for BC and FLEXbc, on performance during the period 2000-2009. All variables are as 
defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, 
and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 6. The impact of flexibility on performance – In-between approach 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable ROA������ VA���� ROA������ VA���� 
     
BC   0.036*** 0.0949*** – – [0.005] [0.019]   
FLEXbc   – – 0.039*** 0.102*** 
  [0.006] [0.020] 
Size   –0.007*** –0.225*** –0.007*** –0.225*** [0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] 
Age   –0.031*** –0.0411*** –0.032*** –0.043*** [0.002] [0.006] [0.002] [0.006] 
Leverage   –0.098*** –0.0265 –0.103*** –0.029 [0.008] [0.022] [0.008] [0.023] 
Risk   0.956*** 2.791*** 0.955*** 2.750*** [0.054] [0.159] [0.056] [0.165] 
Constant 0.324*** 2.239*** 0.370*** 2.419*** 
 [0.018] [0.063] [0.021] [0.088] 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year Obs.  8,960 8,777 8,359 8,190 
Adj. R² 0.223 0.474 0.227 0.475 
Notes: This table contains the results of least squares regressions of the effect of employment flexibility 
on the firm average performance, using the firm averages of BC, FLEXbc, FT, FLEXft, size, age, 
leverage and risk as independent variables. These variables are as defined in Table 1. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, and ** denotes significance at the 5% 
level. 
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Table 7. The impact of flexibility on performance – firms with and without CPPW 
Panel A: Firms without CPPW obligations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable ROA VA ROA VA 
     
BC 0.023*** 0.041*** – – 
 [0.005] [0.015]   
FLEXbc – – 0.023*** 0.036** 
   [0.005] [0.016] 
Size –0.010*** –0.327*** –0.011*** –0.330*** 
 [0.001] [0.005] [0.002] [0.006] 
Age –0.031*** –0.027*** –0.031*** –0.028*** 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.002] [0.006] 
Leverage –0.087*** –0.043** –0.087*** –0.040** 
 [0.006] [0.017] [0.006] [0.018] 
Risk 0.532*** 1.263*** 0.537*** 1.266*** 
 [0.031] [0.084] [0.033] [0.089] 
Constant 0.344*** 3.176*** 0.374*** 3.343*** 
 [0.018] [0.056] [0.015] [0.057] 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year Obs.  28,822 28,204 26,050 25,483 
Adj. R² 0.144 0.562 0.148 0.562 
Notes: This table contains the results of the least squares regressions of the effect of employment 
flexibility on performance during the period 2000-2009 for firms that are not obliged to have a 
Committee for Prevention and Protection at Work (CPPW). All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 7 continued. The impact of flexibility on performance – firms with and 
without CPPW 
Panel B: Firms with a CPPW   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable ROA VA ROA VA 
     
FT –0.023 0.051 – – 
 [0.015] [0.051]   
FLEXft – – –0.021 0.082* 
   [0.014] [0.049] 
Size –0.020*** –0.369*** –0.019*** –0.373*** 
 [0.004] [0.016] [0.004] [0.016] 
Age –0.025*** –0.010 –0.026*** –0.011 
 [0.005] [0.015] [0.005] [0.016] 
Leverage –0.087*** –0.133** –0.087*** –0.172*** 
 [0.017] [0.056] [0.019] [0.057] 
Risk 0.549*** 0.754*** 0.544*** 0.734*** 
 [0.098] [0.238] [0.090] [0.227] 
Constant 0.436*** 3.852*** 0.453*** 4.140*** 
 [0.080] [0.186] [0.045] [0.162] 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year Obs.  2,800 2,685 2,454 2,354 
Adj. R² 0.197 0.672 0.195 0.681 
Notes: This table contains the results of the least squares regressions of the effect of employment 
flexibility on performance during the period 2000-2009 for firms that are obliged to have a Committee 
for Prevention and Protection at Work (CPPW). All variables are as defined in Table 1. Clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at 
the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 8. The impact of flexibility on performance – Knowledge intensity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable ROA VA ROA VA 
     
kia×BC 0.030*** 0.209*** – – 
 [0.001] [0.042]   
(1 – kia)×BC 0.023*** 0.080*** – – 
 [0.005] [0.015]   
kia×FLEXbc – – 0.025** 0.302*** 
   [0.012] [0.059] 
(1 – kia)×FLEXbc – – 0.025*** 0.076*** 
   [0.005] [0.015] 
Size –0.009*** –0.278*** –0.009*** –0.282*** 
 [0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] 
Age –0.030*** –0.024*** –0.031*** –0.025*** 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.002] [0.006] 
Leverage –0.085*** –0.041** –0.086*** –0.034* 
 [0.006] [0.018] [0.006] [0.019] 
Risk 0.536*** 1.334*** 0.542*** 1.333*** 
 [0.030] [0.086] [0.032] [0.091] 
Constant 0.336*** 2.827*** 0.365*** 3.051*** 
 [0.016] [0.053] [0.014] [0.053] 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year Obs.  31,897 31,160 28,751 28,080 
Adj. R² 0.1458 0.5122 0.1506 0.5149 
Notes: This table contains the results of the least squares regressions of the effect of employment 
flexibility on performance during the period 2000-2009. The model includes interactions with a kia 
dummy that takes a value of 1 if a firm is active in a knowledge-intensive activity according to the 
Eurostat classification and 0 otherwise. The other variables are as defined in Table 1. Clustered standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% 
level and, * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Appendix 1. Correlation matrix 
  ROA VA BC FLEXbc FT FLEXft Size Age Leverage Risk 
ROA 1 
         
VA 0.463*** 1 
        
BC 0.118*** 0.242*** 1 
       
FLEXbc 0.079*** 0.178*** 0.530*** 1 
      
FT 0.032*** 0.073*** –0.003 0.024*** 1 
     
FLEXft 0.030*** 0.076*** –0.012*** 0.025*** 0.999*** 1 
    
Size –0.198*** –0.631*** –0.255*** –0.211*** –0.102*** –0.103*** 1 
   
Age –0.169*** –0.174*** 0.015*** –0.088*** –0.086*** –0.086*** 0.180*** 1 
  
Leverage –0.059*** 0.014*** –0.016*** –0.011*** 0.049*** 0.049*** –0.037*** –0.265*** 1 
 
Risk 0.231*** 0.264*** 0.061*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.040*** –0.191*** –0.126*** –0.083*** 1 
    
Notes: This table contains the Pearson correlation coefficients of the main variables in our analysis. Variables are as defined in Table 1.  
*** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
